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THE ROLE OF COURTS IN GOVERNMENT TODAY
JAMES L. OAKES*
T HE SUBJECT of this Arthur E. Whittemore Lecture was chosen with
the late Justice Whittemore's own remarkable career at the Bar and
on the Bench in mind. Justice Whittemore participated at the highest levels
of government in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and was involved
in the highest levels of education and conservation in the State of Vermont.
This lecture is inspired by the contributions he made to us all, not the least
of which was maintaining the courage of his convictions as to what was
right and what was wrong, especially during the days of Senator Joseph
McCarthy, a time when all too many others lost this courage. He recognized
that there is, for those who labor in the fields of the law, a happy middle
road between the ideal and the possible and a need for adjustment and com-
promise which, however, upon confrontation, must yield to the preservation
of individual human rights. Arthur Whittemore has been a person who has
exemplified for me the best in American law and among American lawyers.
The role of the courts in government today was specifically chosen
with the word government in mind. It is a topic that would not even be
discussed in England, for there the courts have no governmental, social or
political role to speak of. They interpret and apply "the law" as laid down
by Parliament or the doctrines of the common law to new fact situations.'
They assiduously avoid political decision-making; businessmen use arbitra-
tion and most administrative law operates outside the courts of law.' The
judges in England do not and cannot declare an Act of Parliament "uncon-
stitutional." Not only is there no written constitution or Bill of Rights against
which to compare the Parliamentary statute, but it is unthinkable in the
British system that the courts would usurp powers traditionally belonging
to Parliament. Custom or convention and political and social pressure per-
form the functions we assign to legal controls.
Here in the United States, however, in addition to deciding private
lawsuits between individuals, the courts are involved in a whole range of
political, social and governmental activities: the operation of school systems,
directing employment of teachers and busing of students3 and sometimes
necessitating local taxation to cover its cost;" we see the courts establishing
*Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. This address was delivered
as the Arthur E. Whittemore Lecture at Marlboro College, Marlboro, Vermont, April 27,
1978.
2 See B. ABEL-SMITH & R. SEVENS, THE LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 1-4 (1967).
21d.
3 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), rehearing denied, 403
U.S. 912 (1971).
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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rules for the conduct of jails,5 mental hospitals,6 and even, in some respects,
the military services.- American courts intervene to keep municipalities from
restricting pamphleteers or parades,' to keep states from criminalizing abor-
tions' or the sale of birth control devices,10 from discharging tenured pro-
fessors," from retaining legislatures that do not follow the principle of one-
man/one-vote, 2 from refusing welfare aid where there is a "man in the
house,"' 3 or even from lowering flags to half-mast on Good Friday.' The
courts also prevent the Federal Congress and the Executive Branch from
depriving individuals of fundamental rights, such as the right to travel be-
tween the states 5 and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.'" Why are the courts dealing with these matters which are policy-
making, seemingly legislative in nature? What are the historical and philo-
sophical reasons that they do so? Are there limits beyond which they should
not tread? Have they gone too far? This lecture will address these questions;
the answers you may draw for yourself.
It is elementary constitutional law that American courts have the power
of judicial review.' While a case can be made (and is still sometimes made
by critics of too much judicial intervention) against the courts' power 8 to
review federal actions against the Constitution or state actions contrary to
the Federal Constitution or statutes, the principle of judicial review is so
well ingrained in the American system that it need not be reargued here.'
5Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afl'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971),
district court ordered to retain juris., 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
6 Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
7 Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976).
8 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 277 N.W. 541 (1938).
12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'L King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968).
'4 Brown v. Thomson, 46 U.S.L.W. 3600 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1978) (order denying stay).
"5 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
:6 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (electronic surveillance
in internal security matters); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 348
(1971).
'7 See generally L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-42 (1967).
is Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv.
L REV. 129 (1893).
19 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 440, 443 (1939).
Professor Thayer's historical scholarship on this subject, 7 HARV. L. REV. at 129-42 while
accurate as far as it goes, does not contain the reference to original sources that permeates,
and hence gives greater depth and impact to, B. BMALVN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967) [hereinafter cited as BAILYN], and G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969) [hereinafter cited as WOOD]. Both Bailyn and Wood give
more historical support to the proposition that the Founding Fathers truly contemplated re-
view of legislative and executive acts by The Third Branch of Government, particularly inso-
[Vol. 14:2
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Rather I shall examine the principal arguments counseling caution and re-
straint in the exercise of the power, even though some of these arguments
seem to run against the very existence of the power, rather than its over-
exercise. I shall also touch upon the forces operating, even where courts
recognize the need for restraint, to cast them even further into the vortex
that is American government. What has happened is that, rather unwillingly
(at least with much reluctance and considerable foot-dragging) the Ameri-
can courts have to a large extent become the crucible in which irresolvable
political conflicts are solved, sometimes soon, sometimes long, after the
fact.
The courts are what I have called the pressure-cooker of American
democracy; the speed of cooking varies with the heat and contents of the
cooker. It is nothing new that in this country the courts are resorted to
for the purpose of resolving social and political disputes. As early as 1835
Alexis de Tocqueville remarked, "Scarcely any potential question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question." 0
Professor James Bradley Thayer made the main arguments counseling
restraint in judicial review at the turn of the century.2' Thayer's arguments
have been restated many times since and by many of the legal greats - in
different contexts to be sure - Oliver Wendell Holmes, Felix Frankfurter
and Learned Hand among the judges, Alexander Bickel and lately Raoul
Berger among the law teachers, and at one time Henry Steele Commager
among the historians, to name a very few. The arguments derive from some
of Jefferson's and perhaps go back to Bishop Hoadley's oft-quoted 1717
dictum, "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver .... ."I' Any exercise or
over-exercise of judicial review is undemocratic, the principal argument runs,
since it constitutes reliance on Platonic Guardians, who are politically ir-
responsible, rather than on the will of the people (or more accurately the
will of the majority) as expressed by the people's representatives in Con-
gress and the state legislatures. An overly activist judiciary, the arguments
continue, weakens the other branches of government in that it encourages
in them irresponsibility; it creates political apathy in the voting public. It
also weakens the judiciary itself because it creates public disrespect for the
far as individual rights were concerned. See Bailyn, id. at 176-97; Wood, id. at 292-93, 409-10,
453-63, and especially 536-43.
20 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Bradley ed. 1960).
21 J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 103-10 (1901). Professor Thayer conceived judicial review as
a "conservative influence," which at the time he was writing it unquestionable was.
22 Bishop Hoadley's Sermon preached before the King, March 31, 1717, on "The Nature
of the Kingdom or Church of Christ" (London: James Knapton, 1717). See Gray, Some
Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence, 6 HARv. L. REv. 21, 33 n.2, (1892).
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courts, since any political decisionmaking necessarily subjects the judiciary
to the rancor of those on the losing side.
These basic arguments have been pursued much more sophisticatedly
than they are stated here;23 they sometimes distinguish between review of
federal and review of state actions, for example. The improper or pro-
business interventions by the courts before 1937 are typically used as specific
illustrations of the abuse of the power of judicial review. You will recall
that the pre-New Deal Court struck down state maximum hour and child
labor legislation, 5 as well as the AAA, the NRA and other New Deal
measures." Even the school desegregation decisions of the Warren Court
in the 1950's, starting with Brown v. Board of Education," are argued by
some advocates of restraint to be outside the "original understanding" of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The principal abortion decision
of the Burger Court in the 1970's is said to be a return to natural law think-
ing, 9 a philosophy which has become disrespected in this century, but which
was influential in the origins of American thought."0 Government by judici-
ary has been roundly condemned as a dangerous exercise of power by a
"super-legislature." 1 And, perhaps partially in response to these arguments,
the Supreme Court itself has within the last few years taken a few steps
to restrict access to the courts,82 to narrow the courts' role' and to cut
back on the substance of individual rights, particularly in, but not only in,
the criminal law area.3
The criticism of the courts' activist role has a certain rationally ab-
stract and historically concrete basis, even if it is inconclusive. In the abstract,
there is much to be said for Judge Learned Hand's semi-mystical and oft-
quoted statement that in the final analysis the spirit of liberty "lies in the
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
23 Compare Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HDv. L. REV. 40 (1961), with
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle and Ex-
pediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
24See Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1194 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Sandalow].
25 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
26 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
27 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
" Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1955); R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
29 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
30 See BAILYN, supra note 19, at 187-88; WOOD, supra note 19, at 293, 301.
31 See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY generally (1977).
32 E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) see Oakes, "A Plague of Lawyers"?: Law and
the Public Interest, 2 VT. L. REV. 1, 17-23 (1977).
33 E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus).
3 4 E.g., Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (federal grand jury); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977) (intent required in segregation cases).
[Vol. 14:2
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 14 [1981], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss2/1
ROLE OF COURTS IN GovERNMENT TODAY
court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to
help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save
it."'3 In the concrete, judicial intervention has in the past sometimes been
counter-productive of individual liberty. The late Nineteenth Century
decisions commencing with the Slaughterhouse Cases," which have left the
Privilege and Immunities Clause of the fourteenth amendment a dead letter
to this day, and extending to Plessy v. Ferguson,"' which upheld Southern
Jim Crow laws, served to emasculate the civil rights acts and amendments:
as Leonard Levy has said, "Congress and the states could not prohibit racial
segregation but the states could compel it."'" I have mentioned the judicial
intervention of the pre-New Deal Court which was simply preservative of
the economic status quo, consisting of free-wheeling laissez-faire capitalism.
Thus there is some historical justification for Professor Thayer's critique
and his 1908 perspective of the role of judicial review as a "conservative
influence." '
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, whom Thayer influenced, were, how-
ever, the constitutional liberals of their day. They were willing to give both
Congress and the state legislatures freer rein, at least in economic matters,
than most of their fellow justices. Holmes, it will be remembered, wrote
that the fourteenth amendment did not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's social
statics."0 But it is a seeming paradox that their staunchest follower, Felix
Frankfurter, and in turn Frankfurter's followers, have been the latter day
"strict constructionists" after whom President Nixon wanted to make over
the Supreme Court. It is ironic, but understandable, I think, that Nixon both
in statement and Supreme Court appointment was a constitutional follower
of Frankfurter, although perhaps an unwitting one. What happened to make
Frankfurter a conservative? For that is what he became, even though he had
been one of the key architects of the New Deal (at least its chief recruiting
officer), and surely the New Deal was liberal-progressive in aim and scope.
How could a follower of Brandeis and Holmes be a constitutional con-
servative?
The answer to this seeming conundrum is insightful. The answer, I
35 L. HAND, THIm SPIrr oF LMERTY 190 (I. Dillard ed. 1952). John Adams in another
context had said on February 13, 1818, in a letter to Hezekiah Niles:
But what do we mean by the American Revolution. Do we mean the American war?
The Revolution was effected before the war commenced. The Revolution was in the
minds and hearts of the people; a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties and
obligations . . . this radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments and af-
fections was the real American Revolution.
3883 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
S7 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
38 L. Levy, Judicial Review, History & Democracy in JuDICL REVIEW AND Tm SUPREME
CoURT 35 (1967).
89 See note 21 supra.
40 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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suggest, is in two parts. The first lies in the logic of the separation of powers
clause-freer rein to the legislative branch-the will of the majority, either
on a local, state or federal level, especially when coupled with a very healthy
respect for the system of federalism, makes for a minimal amount of judicial in-
tervention in economic matters.' Logically, the Frankfurter school would
argue, why should not the same freer rein be given to the will of the majority
in personal matters, social decisionmaking, noneconomic affairs?"2 Frank-
furter (and the large segment of thought then and now for which he stands
as the archetype of judicial restraint) for the most part"3 stuck to the logic
of the thing, the unified, symmetrical view that the judiciary must restrain
itself in all matters. That is where Frankfurter parted company with Brand-
eis and Holmes, each of whom had a vision of government that recognized
its abuses of power, so that they could, for example, hold against its wire-
tapping.'
It is thus not only the logic of the separation of powers clause that
made Frankfurter ultimately the archetype judicial conservative but also
an unwillingness to interpret the broad concepts of the Constitution as
affording limits upon and defining boundaries as to the distribution of
governmental power in our society. When the Frankfurter school's thesis
is carried to its own logical conclusion, individualism and individual rights,
whether in the form of distribution or criminal justice, must yield when the
greater good for the greater number is at stake. The Constitution is read then
not to incorporate the teachings of Mr. Herbert Spencer but so as to in-
corporate the teachings of Jeremy Bentham and the Utilitarians. The logic
of the Whig doctrine of strict separation of powers makes the Court so
interpreting it consistent within itself. It is an inviting secure position for
judges quite reminiscent of the English way of judicial life, to which Frank-
furter constantly alluded. It draws support from some views of the early
Federalists Adams and Hamilton, and from early Jefferson and early James
Madison. Madison's perceptive Federalist Paper No. 10, after all, was to
the effect that the very pluralism of American society would serve to pro-
tect minority needs. He considered a Bill of Rights unnecessary until the
harsh political realities of obtaining ratification and some intensive reanalysis
of the issues changed his position.
And now we can see where the Frankfurter school parted with the
41 Except when the national interest is truly preemptive of the given state's.
42 Of course, there are some economically-oriented analysts who can measure personal
matters in cost-benefit ratios.
43 It would do Justice Frankfurter a grave injustice if his views, say in West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), where
he summoned up the restraint called for by the dissent in the AAA case, United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) in a flag-salute case, were thought
to be his sole legacy. His opinion in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), reflecting
a "shock the conscience" test for due process tends quite the other way.
44 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S, 438, 469, 471 (1928) (dissenting opinions).
[Vol. 14:2
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more absolute activisits Black and Douglas and with the moderates Stone
and later Brennan and others. Stone was the first to recognize the difference,
or better to point out a dichotomy, between property or economic rights
on the one hand and personal, individual rights on the other. This was
in his remarkable footnote 4 to the Carolene Products decision, 5 perhaps
the most famous footnote in Supreme Court history, certainly the most
productive of constitutional philosophizing. There Justice Stone suggested
that there "may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality" when (1) legislation appears on its face to be within
specific prohibitions of the Constitution such as some of the Bill of Rights
or (2) when courts are called upon to determine the validity "of statutes
directed at particular religious . . . or national . . .or racial minorities."
In such cases, he explained, "prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the oper-
ation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry."
Due process could permit greater judicial intervention to protect in-
dividual rights. What a whole train of new thinking and thinkers this
helped to spark! The role of the American judiciary was not simply that
of the English judiciary, for our government was not a parliamentary one.
The judiciary rather was an active third branch protecting minorities and
even individuals against legislative invasions of constitutional precepts in-
stigated by the "major voice of the community."" Eugene Rostow, Charles
Black and a host of others began to explore the democratic nature of judicial
review. 7 And among many other causative forces post-World War II de-
mands and expectations of the largest "discrete minority" in the United
States helped to precipitate this new thinking. With a boost from one of
the more original thinkers in Supreme Court history, Mr. Justice Jackson, 8
real content was given to the long neglected Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. What had been a constitutional dead letter for
seventy-five years since its adoption became alive, and in a two-tiered
analysis very reminiscent of the dichotomy in the Carolene footnote, the
new wave of constitutional thinking gained momentum in the Fifties and
reached high tide in the Sixties. The all too fresh memories of the Rise of
the Third Reich, jostled if not jolted by the excesses of Senator Joseph Mc-
45 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
46 []t would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as
faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated
by the major voice of the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) 494 (John Harvard Library ed. 1961).
47 Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as Rostow]; C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
48 Railway Express Agency v. New York City, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949) (concurring
opinion). See TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAw (rev. ed. 1965).
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Carthy and his followers, resulted in the Court's strengthening the pro-
tections afforded by giving real content to the substantive provisions of
Amendments IV-VIII. A "criminal law revolution" first extended pro-
tections to individuals accused of crime by the federal government and then
to persons accused by the states, by reading those protections into the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. At the same time the Freedom
of Speech and Press Clauses of the first amendment were given greater con-
tent. Then, through an overdue reinterpretation, I would say recognition,
of Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the act originally enacted to
help protect Southern Negroes against the ravages of the Ku Klux Klan,
individuals were given the right to protect their own personal liberties by
suing those other than municipalities who "under color of state law" would
deprive them of those liberties." One commentator has said that what
was a "cautious suggestion" by Justice Stone in the Carolene Products
footnote had "ripened into an attitude."5 Women, students, servicemen,
rebelling against the built-in discriminations of decades or even centuries
past, took their cases to the courts. Prison inmates, mental patients, juve-
niles, all, it seems, had "constitutional rights."'" Teachers, aliens, consum-
ers, all came forward. It seemed for a while that even the poor for that
reason alone might have rights under law-at least indigents could get
lawyers if they were accused of crime52 or a hearing before their welfare
payments were to be terminated.53 Evolving over a period of about three
decades, actually thirty-two years after Carolene Products, there seemed to
come a recognition that no person's freedom may be diminished without
diminishing the freedom of all.5 We had in a word "the Warren Court."
Its critics would say that not only was there judicial solicitude for "par-
ticular religious . . . or national . . .or racial minorities" but there was
"an open-ended invitation to extend similar protections to an ill-defined
assortment of groups that have failed to attain their objectives through
the political process."55
Can the Frankfurter school's restrained view of the courts' role really
satisfy the needs of a rapidly changing, complex, pluralistic society? I
suggest that it cannot in all cases, and often has not in the past. The first
reason is, of course, that power in the nature of things becomes inequitably
49 42 U.S.C. § 1983 derives from Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Chap. 22,
17 Stat. 13. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
50 Sandalow, supra note 24.
51N. DORSEN, THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS (1971); 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, B. NEUBONE,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1976), are the two best collections of
cases.
52 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
53 Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5 4
,See John Donne, DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS XVII, quoted in, B. EVANS,
DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 352 (1968).
15 Sandalow, supra note 24, at 1162.
[Vol. 14:2
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distributed. "[H]ighly organized, wealthy, and motivated groups skilled in
the art of insider politics,""6 as Judge Skelly Wright has put it, have
largely prevailed in the real world of pressure groups, lobbying, campaign
contributions, and the abiding necessity of congressional or executive re-
election. The weak, the unorganized, the poor, the unmotivated have had
their expectations raised, but have not achieved them. It is much harder
to pass a bill correcting an imbalance than it is to defeat such a bill be-
cause it takes the concurrence of both Houses and the Executive to pass,
and the disagreement of only one to defeat.
When Congress or the Executive Branch or an individual state or
states have permitted too great an imbalance to last for too long a time,
they have invited the judicial branch to step in. Legislatively created im-
balances - like the Jim Crow laws - invite judicial intervention.
But legislative inaction also makes for judicial intervention, some of
that intervention is not always wise perhaps, but some of it is necessary to
remedy long-standing but neglected abuse. Neither the states nor the federal
government did anything about segregation in the schools for decades;
Brown v. Board of Education was, in a sense, therefore inevitable. When
Brownes requirement of desegregation "with all deliberate speed,"'" was re-
sisted in the states, it was necessary for the courts to move again. In very real
ways we have a new South and a president who would not have been con-
sidered, let alone elected, had he not been receptive to desegregation.
There are many other examples: the courts have intervened where
there has been a legislative vacuum to protect individuals and individual
rights against the majority will. Many discriminations against women either
built into the laws or permitted to continue without legislative action have
found judicial disapproval. 8 I have mentioned others' rights that have
been trampled upon without public action: shocking conditions in the
prisons of overcrowding, even the use of torture, a total reliance on a spirit
of authoritarianism to break an individual's will, have in turn created through
the courts a whole body of law giving the inmates rights to communicate
with counsel or court, to legal counsel, to minimum standards in terms
of prison conditions, and so on.5 It was only fifteen years ago that states
could prohibit married couples from obtaining contraceptive devices and
punish doctors who furnished them, but the courts have now held other-
"Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L.
REV. 769, 789 (1971).
5T Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). This was the second Brown opinion, and
it dealt with relief. The first and more famous was 346 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 8 See Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HAv. L.
REV. 1, 53-59 (1977).
89See note 29 supra.
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wise.60 When the Brattleboro, Vermont High School tennis team was pro-
hibited from playing their team sport because their hair was too long,
relief was not to be found with the athletic department or the local school
board, but only in the federal court. 1 Are any of these rights too trivial?
I will not multiply examples of judicial intervention that have been necessary
in any socially realistic view of the situation and have been accepted with
considerable public satisfaction, even relief, at the ultimate result.
What is it that these examples tend to prove about judicial intervention
or judicial review? That it may indeed be democratic and is so if we
consider that we are a representative democracy and that individuals and
minorities have rights as such which stand as high in the balance, occasion-
ally even higher, than the majority will, particularly when that will is ex-
pressed in uncertain ways or by unrepresentative bodies or after a real
lack of legislative consideration. Judicial review may indeed give content,
as it has in the field of environmental law, to congressional enactments or
administrative agency rules and regulations."' Judicial intervention may
be educative to the public, alerting it not only to the issues but to the needs
of the minorities involved, as in the case of mental patients or consumers. If
public opinion polls are meaningful, the public disrespect for the courts
evident in the "Impeach Earl Warren" signs in the South in the Fifties has
become throughout the nation a respect that outweighs that afforded to
Congress and from time to time the Executive Branch. This has been so
because the federal judges - despite their lifetime tenures - have been
politically responsible; they have taken oaths to support the Constitution,
they come from regions and backgrounds that do give them a constituency
(the lower federal judges are usually recommended for appointment by
United States Senators); even lifetimes are short, short enough to create
a genuine sense of responsibility among many. And why, Eugene Rostow
has asked, need all officials in a democracy be elected?83
In short, the arguments against judicial intervention made by
Professor Thayer at the turn of the century do not necessarily have
the same force today, at least if the intervention of the courts is
to exert a liberal influence, that is to say, to exert influence on behalf of
the insular and discrete minorities, the weak and the disorganized and to
protect their rights, or, put another way, if the intervention is not purely
utilitarian but progressively individualistic, bringing a measure of justice
to the small as well as the great. The antifederalists who proposed and fought
00 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). (overruling Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)).
61 See Dostert v. Berthold Pub. School Dist., 391 F. Supp. 876 (D.N.D. 1976).
6 2 Compare Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
63 Rostow, supra note 47, at 197.
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for the Bill of Rights,"' who gave the people a charter of rights and as-
signed the courts as guardians of those rights,65 were aware of the danger
of too much power in the hands of legislative majorities and the need for
its check in the judiciary. Were they right?
I have attempted to draw for you the basic arguments for and against
judicial activism and to trace a little of the constitutional history of the
role of the courts in American government today. You have observed, I
am sure, that not only are there diverse views within the judiciary itself
but in the views of commentators and philosophers as to what that role
should be, views which I could only touch upon in the broad scope of this
subject matter. You have observed that there are times and tides of activism
and restraint - you can see the present-day Supreme Court's retreating to
the latter - coinciding perhaps with the tides of social and economic change,
as well as the political response thereto."8 And you have seen a little of
the interaction between the branches and arms of government, of which
the federal judiciary is but one. I have scarcely hinted at the added com-
plexities imposed by the federal system. I have only suggested the incredibly
dynamic, evolving nature of this problem of society and law with which
we have been dealing.
But I trust that I have left you with the thought that there is midst all this
pluralism a dualistic view of the judicial role: one side cautioning restraint,
one promoting activism, a dualistic view that can be traced directly back
to the creation of the American Republic, to the asymmetrical thinking par-
ticularly of Jefferson and Madison, and beyond them to the ideological ori-
gins of our founding forebears. Jefferson expressed it in two sentences in a
1789 letter to Madison, while the latter was coming around to favor and
ultimately to introduce in Congress the Bill of Rights:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into
the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered independ-
ent, and kept strictly to their own department merits great confidence
for their learning and integrity.6
The dualistic view - "if rendered independent" and if "kept strictly to their
own department" - is one that is meaningful today, as we seek better to
apply our rather marvelously-tuned system of government to the rapidly
changing problems we face. Synthesis consists of antitheses. The Constitu-
64 See WOOD, supra note 19, at 541-74.
65 B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 92-94 (1921).
e
6 F. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 52 (Bander ed. 1963):
I"]But there's wan thing I'm sure about."
"What's that?" asked Mr. Hennessy.
'That is," said Mr. Dooley, "no matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not,
th' supreme coort follows th' illiction returns."
e7 Letter of March 15, 1789, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 438 (Viking Press 1975).
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tion, I suggest, is like poems and geodesic domes in the sense that it "main-
tains its shape and stasis by a complex of forces pulling against each
other'" s - a tension. One of the peculiar aspects of its genius, I submit,
is that it permits of the resolution of the conflict between majority rule and
minority or individual rights in particular cases where that tension has
broken down even while in general the conflicting forces continue to pull
against each other in a constant state of tension that is for the most part
creative.
68 See J. JERomE, THE POET AND THE POEM (1974).
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